

Message Text

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ORIGIN EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 ACDA-19 NEA-10

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11 AECE-00 OMB-01 /148 R

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE

USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

USNMR SHAPE

AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T STATE 222697

VIENNA FOR MBFR, GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: FRG AND UK PRE-REDUCTION CON

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STRAINTS DRAFTS

REFS: A. USNATO 5341, B. USNATO 5375, C. USNATO 5376
D. USNATO 5356

1. WE ARE SENDING US POSITION ON STABILIZING MEASURES, INCLUDING ISSUE OF PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS, IN SEPARATE MESSAGE. THIS POSITION TOOK LATEST ALLIED VIEWS AND FACT OF SOVIET PROPOSAL INTO CONSIDERATION.

2. WE WOULD OPPOSE UK CONCEPT OF AGREEMENT NOT TO INCREASE FORCES, EVEN PERSONNEL, DURING NEGOTIATION. OUR REASONS RELATE IN PART TO PROTECTION OF NATO FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM. EVEN A SIMPLY WORDED PROVISION DEALING SOLELY WITH PERSONNEL LEVELS COULD PROVIDE SOVIETS WITH POTENTIAL PRETEXT TO INTERFERE WITH PLANNED IMPROVEMENTS, E.G., INCREASES IN IMPORTANT WEAPONS SYSTEMS SUCH AS ALLIED TANKS, IN THAT UK PROPOSAL WOULD INVITE SOVIETS TO INSIST THAT EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE INCLUDED. SOVIET PROPOSAL CURRENTLY IN HAND SUPPORTS THIS PERCEPTION. FURTHERMORE, WE WANT FIRST PHASE TO DEAL WITH US AND SOVIET FORCES. UK PROPOSAL WOULD MEAN A CEILING ON ALL NATO FORCES. WE MAY NEED TO ACCOMMODATE SOVIET PRESSURES TO INCLUDE OTHER FORCES

HOWEVER, UK PROPOSAL MEANS WE WOULD GIVE AWAY AT THE OUTSET SOMETHING NATO WOULD WISH TO OFFER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ONLY MUCH LATER, IF AT ALL. WE BELIEVE IT UNDESIRABLE TO MAKE SUCH A MAJOR CONCESSION TO THE SOVIETS AT THIS STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND WITHOUT RECEIVING AN ADEQUATE QUID PRO QUO IN CONTEXT OF REDUCTIONS.

3. WITH REGARD TO THE SUGGESTION THAT MEASURE III, LIMITATIONS ON MAJOR EXERCISES, BE PROPOSED EARLY, BUT WITH GENERAL WORDING, LIMITED DURATION, AND APPLICATION TO HUNGARY, WE BELIEVE THAT THE WORDING AND APPLICATION WOULD HAVE TO BE VERY CAREFULLY CONSIDERED. WE WILL BE SUGGESTING SPECIFIC WORDING FOR THIS MEASURE SEPTTEL. THE SUGGESTION THAT THIS MEASURE BE APPLIED TO HUNGARY RAISES BROADER ISSUES, INCLUDING THE PREFERRED ALLIANCE APPROACH TO NON-CIRCUMVENTION, WHICH IN OUR VIEW CANNOT BE

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QUICKLY RESOLVED.

4. SO FAR AS THE AREA OF APPLICATION IS CONCERNED, WE AGREE WITH THE "ALLIANCE APPROACH" WHICH PROVIDES THAT "THESE MEASURES WOULD BE PUT FORWARD, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, AS APPLYING ONLY TO MOVEMENTS INTO AND ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA ALTHOUGH THE POSSIBILITY OF APPLYING SUCH MEASURES TO FORCES IN SPECIFIED AREAS

OUTSIDE THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA IS NOT EXCLUDED."

UNITED STATES VIEWS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN FOCUS FOR MBFR ARE WELL-KNOWN, AS ARE THE CONCERNS OF OTHER ALLIES WITH REGARD TO AREA OF APPLICATION. HOWEVER, SINCE WE ARE CONSIDERING "THE FIRST INSTANCE," WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE AREA OF APPLICATION OF STABILIZING MEASURES NEED NOT BE IMMEDIATE ISSUE FOR PURPOSES OF THIS DISCUSSION.

5. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE ON FRG AND UK PROPOSALS THAT MBFR STABILIZING MEASURES ON PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAJOR EXERCISES AND EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS, NOT BE RAISED FOR NEGOTIATION IN MBFR BUT INSTEAD (IN THE UK DRAFT) BE HANDLED IN CSCE, OR (IN THE FRG DRAFT) PERHAPS BE RAISED IN MBFR FOLLOWING RESOLUTION IN CSCE.

6. WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO SEEK REAL MEASURES OF CONSTRAINT IN MBFR AS A MEANS OF LIMITING THE CHANCES FOR DESTABILIZING ACTIONS AND ADDING TO THE CONFIDENCE OF GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLICS THAT OVERALL AGREEMENTS MAINTAIN UNDIMINISHED SECURITY.

7. WITH REGARD TO THE SUGGESTION THAT MEASURES II AND IV REMAIN FOR THE TIME BEING WITH CSCE, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT CONSIDERATION OF THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE LEFT SOLELY TO CSCE FOR SEVERAL REASONS. FIRST, THIS SUGGESTION WOULD CONSTITUTE AN INVITATION FOR CSCE TO ESTABLISH MANDATES FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WE FIRMLY OPPOSE; IT WOULD ALSO SERVE AS INCENTIVE FOR CSCE PARTICIPANTS TO SEEK TO PLACE GREATER SECURITY CONTENT INTO CSCE, WHICH WE WOULD ALSO OPPOSE. SECOND, THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

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IN CSCE ARE NOT THE SAME AS THESE TWO STABILIZING MEASURES IN MBFR, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE SIMILAR IN CONCEPT. FOR ONE THING, THE CSCE MEASURES ARE ENVISAGED BY BOTH ALLIES AND THE EAST AS BASICALLY VOLUNTARY, AND IT IS UNREALISTIC, BASED ON ONGOING DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA, TO EXPECT THEM TO PRODUCE RESULTS SIGNIFICANTLY BEYOND DECLARATIONS OF INTENT OF VARYING DEGREES OF SPECIFICITY, OR TO YIELD A CONCRETE BENCHMARK OF BEHAVIOR OF THE TYPE THAT SHOULD APPROPRIATELY EMERGE FROM MBFR. THIRD, THE TIMING OF CSCE DISCUSSIONS AND THE CONTENT OF CSCE AGREEMENT ON THESE MEASURES ARE UNCERTAIN, AND SHOULD NOT GOVERN OUR DISINCTIONS AS TO HOW TO PROCEED IN MBFR.

8. FOR BONN. YOU SHOULD APPROACH FOREIGN MINISTRY AT SENIOR LEVEL TO CONVEY SUBSTANCE OF PARAS 2, 6 AND 7 AND

TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE US IS NOT PREPARED TO SEE CSCE
ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR MEASURES EQUIVALENT IN SERIOUS-
NESS TO THOSE WHICH COULD EMERGE FROM MBFR, AND THAT IN
SUM WE ARE NOT WILLING TO MAKE CSCE CBMS A SUBSTI-
TUTE FOR MBFR CONSTRAINTS.

9. FOR LONDON. YOU SHOULD CONVEY FOREGOING TO APPRO-
PRIATE LEVEL IN FCO. RUSH

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